Bryan Burrough's book describes a clash of engineering cultures in that most challenging of environments - low earth orbit. The author was previously best known for his account of the takeover of the American industrial giant RJR Nabisco, and his experience of space matters before researching this book was limited to covering the 1986 Challenger accident for the Wall Street Journal .

In Dragonfly he relates the story of the visits by American crew members to the Russian space station Mir and the struggle to maintain Mir in the face of breakdowns and accidents. The book is uncompromising in its examination of Nasa management shortcomings.

Burrough criticises, in particular, the management of the Johnson Space Center, the organisation responsible for Nasa's manned spaceflight programme.

He attributes the failings to the fact that the programme was partly managed by practising astronauts, such as Frank Culbertson, who had overall responsibility for the Mir missions. Many astronauts are driven by the ambition, invariably held since childhood, to take a ride into orbit as early and as often as possible. This motive may determine the conduct of their careers. It is a mistake, then, to put them in a position in which their decision-making might be affected by the need to please those who select crews. The book uncovers the consequences of this, and Nasa should take Burrough's analysis seriously.

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The portraits of key figures are accurate and fair. The same cannot be said for some of the technical descriptions, though Burrough succeeds in getting the essence across. It is a pity, too, to see little reference to the French and other non-Soviet manned missions to Mir and Salyut , some of which taught lessons only recently learnt by the Americans. The events surrounding the Progress/Spektr collision are dealt with at some length. The event has yet to be satisfactorily concluded, not only in engineering terms but also with regard to the lasting attitudes of the International Space Station partners. Unlike the Russians, Nasa believes that such a thing will never happen again because it has imposed its standards.

It is an echo of cold war propaganda to hear the Americans express their belief that such events were the result of a Russian lack of respect for human life. Their attitude is unhelpful in ensuring safety on the International Space Station. Encouragingly, Burrough himself does not make this mistake.

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Recent years on board Mir have been fraught with danger. There are many who believe that manned spaceflight must be treated as an adventurous yet risky enterprise. Participants are aware of this, and leaders ensure that teams are made up of like-minded people who understand the importance of collective effort.

Nasa, by contrast, considered that the sacred American lives on Mir were assured by legal safeguards and by a service whose reliability and safety was well established.

This was never the Russians' belief: for them, the Mir mission was a parcel of risks to be equally shared. Thus, visits to the space station were not a service, despite the contract that was drawn up and the money that was paid. It was a partnership, with some reimbursement of costs. Crew members must integrate, even to the detriment of their relations with their own support people on the ground, who themselves must integrate with their hosts.

For the European Space Agency missions, this was understood from the outset, and the Esa team in Moscow centred around people already experienced in Russian ways. The Americans, as Burrough shows, did not do this.

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The long story of the Western European missions to Russian space stations, apart from that of Reinhold Ewald, is not referred to in this book. Indeed, the net result of that long association is somewhat different from the Russian-US collaboration. The Americans breathed a sigh of relief following their last mission, believing Mir to be a death-trap.

Nearly a year after the final act of Nasa Phase 1, the French space agency, CNES, sent Jean-Pierre Haigner¨¦, an old Mir hand and former crewmate of Vasily Tsibliyev, for a long duration mission. This was a natural continuation of their association with Russian manned spaceflight since June 1982, and carried a double irritation for Nasa. Apart from their contrasting view of safety, the Americans believe that an independent programme should not exist in order that Russian obligations be met for the International Space Station.

From his business-analyst standpoint, Burrough offers a valuable insight into the workings of international collaboration, Nasa-style. I heartily recommend this expose.

Tim Stevenson was responsible for the two largest payloads of the European Space Agency's second visit to Mir , Euro mir 95. His company, Mare Crisium, provides consultancy to Esa for its flight programmes, including its contributions to the International Space Station.

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